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COMMENT
Vested Seniority Rights: A Conceptual
Approach
Under contemporary jurisprudence, vested seniority rights
are considered creatures of contract. As such, they generally
are subject to "divestiture" with the termination of the collec-
tive-bargaining agreement. Relying upon Zdanok v. Glidden Co.
and Locke's labor theory of property, the author argues that
seniority rights are property rights derived from the worker's
employment independent of the contract.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, there has been an infusion of traditional philo-
sophical thought into the field of American legal scholarship.' Al-
though many authors have attempted to apply a Marxist approach
to a particular legal doctrine,2 few have discussed John Locke's in-
1. See generally Hart, Utilitarianism and Natural Rights, 53 TUL. L. REv. 663 (1979);
Hexter, Thomas Hobbes and the Law, 65 CORNELL L. Rsv. 471 (1980); Shiner, Hart and
Hobbes, 22 WM. & MARY L. REv. 201 (1980); Stein, Adam Smith's Jurisprudence-Between
Morality and Economics, 64 CORNELL L. REv. 621 (1979); Weinrib, Utilitarianism, Econom-
ics and Legal Theory, 30 U. TORONTO L.J. 307 (1980). For a discussion of the application of
contemporary European thought to American legal scholarship, see Hermann, Phenomenol-
ogy, Structuralism, Hermeneutics, and Legal Study: Applications of Contemporary Conti-
nental Thought to Legal Phenomena, 36 U. MIAMI L. RRV. 379 (1982).
2. See, e.g., B. EDELMAN, OWNERSHIP OP THE IMAGE: ELEMENTS FOR A MARXIST THEORY
OF LAw (1979).
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fluence on American legal scholarship.3 Nonetheless, Locke has
played an important role in shaping both our political institutions4
and our attitude toward private property. Therefore, it is surpris-
ing that more commentators have not discussed the jurisprudential
implications of his theories.
One of Locke's major contributions is his labor theory of prop-
erty, which asserts that a laborer has a property right in the prod-
uct of his work. Today, however, conventional wisdom maintains
that an employee's rights stem from a contract or collective-bar-
gaining agreement, and not from an inherent property interest.
The distinction between these two theories is extremely important
to an understanding of the employer-employee relationship. For
example, Locke's theory suggests that an employee's property
right, once vested, cannot be divested by contract or otherwise
without the consent of the employee. But under the traditional
view, an employee's property rights are subject to divestiture upon
termination of his employment contract. As this Comment will il-
lustrate, the tension between these two theories results from an
incoherent approach toward a definition of property rights.
II. A STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM: Cooper AND Glidden
The concept of vested seniority rights generally has been lim-
ited to public employment.5 Courts tend to view seniority rights in
the private sector as creatures of contract, whose creation depend
on the terms of particular contracts.' For example, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit observed in 1941 that
"collective bargaining agreements do not create a permanent sta-
tus, give an indefinite tenure, or extend rights created and arising
under the contract, beyond its life, when it has been terminated in
3. A notable exception is Hamilton, Property According to Locke, 41 YALE L.J. 864
(1932).
4. Locke's influence on the Bill of Rights and the fourteenth amendment is clear. The
fifth and fourteenth amendments' prohibition against arbitrary interference with "life, lib-
erty, and property" is foreshadowed by two aspects of Locke's Second Treatise: the limita-
tions that it imposes on legislative power and its emphasis on property rights. J. LocKE, The
Second Treatise of Government, in Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (P. Laslett ed. 1960).
5. The Supreme Court of the United States has held that a tenured college professor at
a state university has an interest in continued employment and that his interest is safe-
guarded by due process. Slochower v. Board of Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956).
6. See, e.g., Baker v. Newspaper & Graphic Communication Union, 628 F.2d 156, 159-
60 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Ekas v. Carling Nat'l Breweries, Inc., 602 F.2d 664, 666-67 (4th Cir.
1979); Charland v. Norge Div., Borg-Warner Corp., 407 F.2d 1062, 1064 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 871 (1969); Interscience Encyclopedia Inc., 55 Lab. Arb. 210 (1970) (Rob-
erts, Arb.).
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accordance with its provisions . . . ." Litigation in this area in-
volves problems in determining seniority rights in various situa-
tions, such as layoffs,8 promotions," interdepartmental transfers,' 0
nergers," consolidations, 2 and plant shutdowns.'3
The import of prevailing authority is that seniority rights in
the private sector are only as secure as the underlying employment
contract. But seniority rights were not always, and need not now
be, so tenuous. Indeed, the employee finds far greater security
under Locke's labor theory of property. A comparison of Cooper v.
General Motors Corp.'4 and Zdanok v. Glidden Co.' 5 illustrates
these two disparate approaches to the issue of vested seniority
rights.
In Cooper supervisory employees of the General Motors Cor-
poration (GM) brought a class action suit against GM and the
United Automobile Workers (UAW), seeking to enjoin enforce-
ment of seniority provisions of a collective-bargaining agreement
that did not accord seniority privileges in the bargaining unit to
supervisory employees laid off by GM. Before 1976 the collective-
bargaining agreement provided that a member of the bargaining
unit would continue to accumulate unit seniority after being pro-
moted out of the bargaining unit into a non-unit position.' 6 But
the 1976 agreement 7 eliminated the accumulation of unit seniority
by employees working as supervisors.18
The plaintiffs argued that in accepting supervisory positions
7. System Fed'n No. 59 of Ry. Employees Dep't v. Louisiana & Atl. Ry., 119 F.2d 509,
515 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 656 (1941).
8. See, e.g., Edwards v. Capital Airlines, Inc., 176 F.2d 755 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 338
U.S. 885 (1949).
9. See, e.g., Stewart v. Day & Zimmermann, Inc., 294 F.2d 7 (5th Cir. 1961).
10. See, e.g., Napier v. System Fed'n No. 91, Ry. Employes' Dep't, 127 F. Supp. 874
(D.C. Ky. 1955).
11. See, e.g., Carver v. Brien, 315 Ill. App. 643, 43 N.E.2d 597 (1942).
12. See, e.g., Moore v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 356 S.W.2d 241 (Ky. 1962).
13. See, e.g., Oddie v. Ross Gear & Tool Co., 305 F.2d 143 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 371
U.S. 941 (1962).
14. 651 F.2d 249 (5th Cir. 1981).
15. 288 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1961), rev'g 185 F. Supp. 441 (S.D.N.Y. 1960), cert. denied in
relevant part, 368 U.S. 814 (1961). Zdanok was overruled in 1968 by Local 1251 UAW v.
Robertshaw Controls Co., 405 F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1968).
16. 651 F.2d at 250.
17. During negotiations of the new agreement, the UAW did not represent the supervi-
sory employees because of their supervisory status. Id.
18. The new contract provided that an employee transferred from a supervisory posi-
tion to a job classification in the bargaining unit would be credited with seniority accumu-
lated prior to March 1, 1977, and with time worked in the bargaining unit after that date.
Id.
1982]
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they had detrimentally relied on the assurance of seniority status
under the original contract. Further, they claimed that GM, by
agreeing to and applying the 1976 contract, had violated its prior
agreement with the supervisory personnel.' 9 GM and the UAW
moved for summary judgment, arguing that the supervisory per-
sonnel did not have vested seniority rights in the bargaining unit
and that neither GM nor the UAW had breached the existing con-
tract.2" Without stating its reasons, the district court granted the
motion. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit affirmed, holding that seniority rights are a creature
of collective bargaining and consequently, seniority rights con-
ferred in a prior contract can be divested in a subsequent
contract."'
Although Cooper is in the mainstream of contract and federal
labor law, Zdanok v. Glidden Co. represents an approach to vested
seniority rights unique in American labor law. In Glidden five for-
mer employees sought damages against their employer, alleging a
breach of the seniority provisions of a collective-bargaining agree-
ment. As the expiration date of the agreement approached, the em-
ployer notified the union that it would not renew the collective-
bargaining agreement.2 2 The employer began to reduce production
at its factory in Elmhurst, New York and to remove its machinery
and equipment to a newly established plant in Bethlehem, Penn-
sylvania, where it continued to produce similar products. The em-
ployer then discharged its New York employees and refused to re-
hire them at the Bethlehem plant except as new employees with no
seniority status.23
The plaintiffs argued that the seniority rights created by the
collective-bargaining agreement survived the employer's termina-
tion of the contract, 4 and that they were entitled to reinstatement
19. Id.
20. Supervisory employees brought this class action claiming that they had vested
rights in the collective bargaining agreement that had expired and that they had detrimen-
tally relied on the previous agreement when they accepted non-unit positions. Id.
21. Id. at 250-51.
22. Zdanok v. Glidden Co., 185 F. Supp. 441, 443 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 288 F.2d 99 (2d Cir.
1960), cert. denied in relevant part, 368 U.S. 814 (1961). In effecting the termination of the
contract, the employer complied with all statutory and contractual requirements. The plain-
tiffs' suit concerned the loss of their seniority rights resulting from the expiration of the
contract.
23. Id.
24. Under the seniority system in effect at Elmhurst, employees were to be laid
off in reverse order of plant seniority and recalled in inverse order of layoff. In
instances of continuous layoff, the seniority of an employee with less than five
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with similar seniority status at the Bethlehem plant."5 The em-
ployer disputed the survivorship claim, maintaining that seniority
rights ceased to exist when it properly terminated the collective-
bargaining agreement. 2 The district court agreed with the em-
ployer and held that the seniority system in the collective-bargain-
ing agreement did not give the employees "the right to 'follow their
work' to the new plant. ' 27 The United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit reversed, holding that seniority rights that had
vested by virtue of the employees' compliance with their collective-
bargaining agreement "could not be unilaterally annulled" by the
employer.2" In construing the language of the contract, the court
found that "the reasonable expectations of the parties" would be
fulfilled by interpreting the contract to accord the Elmhurst em-
ployees seniority rights at the Bethlehem plant.29 Seven years
years' employment was to terminate after two years' continuous layoff; for em-
ployees with more than five years' service, seniority was to be terjninated at the
end of three years. If seniority has been terminated by reason of continuous lay-
off, a former employee would still be entitled to preference before new employ-
ees were hired.
Id. at 446 (footnotes omitted).
25. 288 F.2d at 101. The plaintiffs maintained that their seniority status would have
survived the termination of the collective-bargaining agreement had the Elmhurst plant's
operations continued. Further, they argued that transfer of their seniority rights to jobs in
the new plant did not adversely affect the Bethlehem operations, because the new plant
contained approximately seventy-five percent of the machinery previously used at the Elm-
hurst plant, and also because the new employees performed virtually the same duties as
their counterparts at the old site. 185 F. Supp. at 443 & nn.4-5.
26. The preamble of the union contract read: "This Agreement Made and Entered into
• ..for and on behalf of its plant facilities located at Corona Avenue and 94th Street, Elm-
hurst, Long Island, New York. . . ." 185 F. Supp. at 448 n.27. The defendant relied upon
this specific geographical limitation to prove that the seniority provisions of the contract
applied only to the Elmhurst plant.
27. 185 F. Supp. at 447. The court read the geographic description in the contract as
limiting the scope of the employees' seniority rights. Indeed, the district court found this
restrictive language to be a valuable consideration that gave rise to a valid contract. Id. at
448.
28. 288 F.2d at 103.
29. Id. at 104. Judge Madden concluded that the narrow geographical description in the
preamble to the collective-bargaining agreement could not be regarded as setting fixed
boundaries to the scope of the agreement. Narrowly construed, Glidden is based on either
equitable considerations or national labor policies. A broad interpretation of the decision
suggests that an employee with vested seniority rights has the right to "follow the work" to
a new job site.
In departing from the norm, the Glidden court apparently relied on two important fac-
tors: the similarity of the work being performed at both plants and a clause in the employ-
ment contract providing for reemployment within a specific time period. Id.; see Blumrosen,
Seniority Rights and Industrial Change: Zdanok v. Glidden Co., 47 MINN. L. REv. 505, 511-
12 (1963).
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later, however, the Second Circuit overruled Glidden."
III. LOCKE'S INFLUENCE ON AMERICAN LEGAL AND POLITICAL
PHILOSOPHY
A. Locke's Labor Theory of Property
At its most basic level, the disparity between Cooper and
Glidden can be explained either in terms of contract law or federal
labor law."' At a different, more troublesome level, the disparity
between the two opinions can be understood as a clash between
different attitudes toward property rights. To this end, John
Locke's labor theory of property acquisition is a useful tool in de-
fining the nature of seniority rights arising out of a collective-bar-
gaining agreement.
Briefly stated, the fundamental concept of the labor theory of
property acquisition "is that people are entitled to hold, as prop-
erty, whatever .they produce by their own initiative, intelligence,
and industry."" This theory is derived from the premise that one
has a property right in his own body.33 This right arises from the
fact that people, in general, have a duty not to interfere with the
rights of others. After all, property rights are simply a means of
regulating the rights of people with respect to their property. Ac-
cording to Locke, one person's "life, liberty, and estate" may be
limited only to protect the equally valid claims of some other per-
son who has the same rights. In this context, "[piroperty rights
I as in the standard cases of ownership, are fundamentally
rights to exclude others."34
30. Local 1251 UAW v. Robertshaw Controls Co., 405 F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc).
Chief Judge Lombard, the lone dissenter in Glidden, wrote the majority opinion in Robert-
shaw. The Second Circuit in Robertshaw overruled Glidden for several reasons. First, com-
mentators sharply criticized the decision, and courts and arbitrators refused to follow its
rule. Id. at 31-32. Second, the court decided to construe strictly the language in the collec-
tive-bargaining agreement that placed geographical limitations on the employee's seniority
rights. Id. at 32. Third, a shift in jurisprudential thinking led the court of appeals to state
that the "basic proposition of [Glidden], that senority is a vested right, finds no support
...in the socio-economic setting of labor-management relations. Seniority is wholly a crea-
tion of the collective agreement and does not exist apart from that agreement." Id. at 33.
31. Under federal labor law, seniority is not inherent in the employment relationship
but arises out of the contract. Broniman v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 353 F.2d 559, 561 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 907 (1965). If seniority rights are to persist beyond the term of a
contract, the agreement must so provide or be susceptible of such a construction. See Local
36 v. Brotherhood of Ry., Airline & S.S. Clerks, 496 F. Supp. 1160, 1166 (E.D. Mich 1980).
32. L. BECKER, PROPERTY RIGHTS: PHILOSOPHIC FOUNDATIONS 32 (1977).
33. J. LocKE, supra note 4, § 27.
34. L. BECKER, supra note 32, § 37 (emphasis in original).
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Locke begins his analysis of property rights with a description
of the state of nature. 5 In this realm, men have a collective rather
than an individual right of ownership.3 6 Locke's conceptualization
of property rights in the state of nature differs from his labor the-
ory, which presupposes that property rights in the fruits of one's
labor vest in the individual. Thus, from a theoretical perspective,
Locke's most difficult task is to demontrate "how Men might come
to have a property in several parts of that which God gave to Man-
kind in common.137
The explanation of Locke's theory is found in the transition
from original communism to private ownership. The economic im-
peratives of maximizing the use of the community's resources and
preventing their waste accounted for this shift in ideology.38 An
individual's right of appropriation was a concomitant result of this
new economic philosophy. The nature that Locke described as
granting the individual the opportunity of possession "does also
bound that Property too" so that no one may "ingross as much as
he will." 9
The transition from a collective to an individual right of own-
ership necessitated a new conceptualization of society. So long as
there was a collective right, men only had duties to each other.
But with the introduction of private property, men had a duty not
only to the individual but also to his property. Men were led,
therefore, to leave the state of nature and set up social and politi-
cal organizations to find a source of power "for the Regulating and
35. Locke characterized the state of nature as one of "Peace, Good Will, Mutual Assis-
tance and Preservation." J. LocKE, supra note 4, § 19.
36. The justification for property rights in Locke's state of nature is similar to those of
other thinkers of his time. Mankind's right to the goods of nature derives from God's grant
in the Scriptures, from man's rationality, and from the fundamental natural law of self-
preservation. Id. § 25.
37. Id.
38. These premises are as follows: "[M]en, being once born, have a right to their Pres-
ervation, and consequently to Meat and Drink, and such other things, as Nature affords for
their Subsistence . . . ." Id. § 25. The earth and its yield were given to men "for the Sup-
port and Comfort of their being," and though they belonged to mankind in common, "yet
being given for the use of Men, there must of necessity be a means to appropriate them
some way. . . before they can be of any use, or at all beneficial to any particular Man." Id.
§ 26. The rightful means of appropriation is derived from the premise that "every Man has
a Property in his own Person", so that "(tihe Labour of his Body, and the Work of his
Hands" are his. Id. § 27. Therefore, whatsoever "he removes out of the State that Nature
hath provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his Labour with ... and thereby makes it his
Property." Id. Because things that exist with a surplus are without intrinsic value, the sole
source of value lies in man's labor. Id. § 40.
39. Id. § 31.
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Preserving of [their] Property. '4 0
The introduction of money catalyzed the formation of this
new social and political framework. Locke depicted money as an
outgrowth of the barter system and characterized it as "some last-
ing thing that Men might keep without spoiling, and that by mu-
tual consent Men would take in exchange for the truly useful, but
perishable Supports of Life." 4' The use of money fostered a system
of exchange that allowed men to cultivate more land than was nec-
essary for their support, 2 which in turn enabled individuals to
alienate their labor. Locke recognized the exchange value of labor
when men began to trade their services for goods.
The exchange system presupposed that man had the right of
appropriation. After all, a man could not barter with property that
he did not own and control. In this sense, the new economic order
based on private ownership differed markedly from original com-
munism, which had imposed several limitations on an individual's
right of appropriation: First, a man could appropriate property
only if he left property equal in amount and in kind;41 second, be-
cause property belonged to the community, it was wrongful for a
man to appropriate more property than he could use;4 4 and third, a
man's rightful appropriation was not to exceed the amount that he
could procure with his own labor."
The introduction of money allowed men to overcome these
limitations. As to the first limitation, Locke's depiction of money
as capital was antithetical to the desire to hoard. In The Political
Theory of Possessive Individualism," C.B. Macpherson explained
how the introduction of money overcame the spoilage limitation:
40. Id. § 3.
41. Id. § 47. Before the emergence of money, the law permitted commoners to do three
things with the products of their labor: use these goods themselves for support and comfort,
give them away, or barter with them. See id. § 46. In so doing, a commoner "did no injury;
he wasted not the common Stock; destroyed no part of the portion of Goods that belonged
to others, so long as nothing perished uselessly in his hands." Id.'
42. Men have agreed to disproportionate and unequal Possession of the Earth,
they having by a tacit and voluntary consent found out a way, how a man may
fairly possess more land than he himself can use the product of, by receiving in
exchange for the overplus, Gold and Silver, which may be hoarded up without
injury to any one, these metall's not spoileing or decaying in the hands of the
possessor.
Id. § 50.
43. Id. § 27.
44. Id. § 31.
45. Id. § 32.
46. C. MACPHERSON, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF POSSESSIVE INDIVIDUALISM (1962).
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The introduction of money is shown to provide both the op-
portunity and the reason (which could not have existed previ-
ously) for a man to enlarge his Possessions beyond the use of his
Family, and a plentiful supply to its Consumption, either in
what their own Industry produced, or they could barter for like
perishable, useful Commodities, with others'. It is 'Commerce
. . . to draw Money to him by the Sale of the Product' that pro-
vides the reason for appropriation of land in excess of what
would provide 'a plentiful supply to [his family's]
Consumption.'17
The second limitation on appropriation-the prevention of
waste-was deemed unnecessary under a system of private owner-
ship. Locke suggested that under the exchange system, there would
be less waste and enough property for all men.4 In this way, the
exchange system served as an impetus for larger possessions, over-
coming*the sufficiency limitations imposed in the state of nature.
'Locke assumed that the increase in productivity would be distrib-
uted to those left without land, and that private appropriation
would actually increase the amount left for others:'
No doubt at some point, there is no longer as much left for
others. But if there is not then enough and as good land left for
others, there is enough and as good (indeed a better) living left
for others. And the right of all men to a living was the funda-
mental right from which Locke had in the first place deduced
their right to appropriate land. Not only is as good a living pro-
vided for others after the appropriation of all the land; it is by
the appropriation of all the land that a better living is created
47. Id. at 205 (quoting J. LocKE, supra note 4, § 48).
48. The initial natural law rule, "that every man should have as much as he could make
use of," was undermined by the invention of money. J. LocKx, supra note 4, § 36. Locke
specifically stated,
[H]e who appropriates land to himself by his labour, does not lessen but increase
the common stock of mankind. For the provisions serving to the support of hu-
mane life, produced by one acre of inclosed and cultivated land, are (to speak
much within compasse) ten times more, than those, which are yielded by an acre
of Land, of an equal richnesse, lyeing wast in common. And therefor he, that
incloses Land and has a greater plenty of the conveniencys of life from ten acres,
than he could have from an hundred left to Nature, may truly be said, to give
ninety acres to Mankind. For his labour now supplys him with provisions out of
ten acres, which were but the product of an hundred lying in common.
Id. § 37.
49. Cf. J. LocKE, The First Treatise of Government, in Two TRz&Tszs or GOVERNMENT
§§ 41-42 (P. Laslett ed. 1960) ("Charity gives every Man a title to so much out of another's
Plenty, as will keep him from extream want, where he has no means to subsist otherwise
. . . ."1).
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for others.5 0
Thus, through the alienation of one's labor, those without land can
satisfy their natural right to subsistence.
The transcendence of the third limitation on appropriation in
the state of nature-that one could procure only as much property
as he could earn with his labor-is important to the development
of a conceptual approach to vested seniority rights. At the core of
this development is the realization that labor is a form of property
and thus can be exchanged or alienated .5  The free alienation of
property and labor is essential to capitalist production. Locke is
careful, however, to distinguish the alienation of one's labor from
the alienation of one's life. Macpherson points out that "Locke did
not care to recognize that the continual alienation of labour for a
bare subsistence wage, which he asserts to be the necessary condi-
tion of wage-labourers throughout their lives, is in effect an aliena-
tion of life and liberty.''1 2
The development of a wage relationship has far-reaching im-
50. C. MACPHERSON, supra note 46, at 212.
51. Id. at 214-15.
52. Id. at 220. This point is central to Karl Marx's ideology:
Marx's analysis of the concept of alienated labor consists of four successive
steps: (1) Since it does not belong to him, the product of his labor appears to the
workers as an alien object. (2) Consequently, the worker considers his work as
imposed, forced labor. It is not the satisfaction of a need, but only a means for
satisfying other needs. This is the relationship of the worker to his own activity
as something alien and not belonging to him. (3) "Conscious labor reverses the
relationship, in that man because he is a self-conscious being makes his life ac-
tivity, his being, only a means for his existence . . .Thus alienated labor turns
the species life of man. . . into an alien being, and into a means for his individ-
ual existence. It alienates . . . his human life." (4) "A direct consequence of the
alienation of man from the product of his labor, from his life activity and from
his species life is that man is alienated from other men." From these considera-
tions about the alienated labor stems the final conclusion concerning the nature
of private property: "Private property is . . . the product . . . of alienated la-
bor, of the external relations of the worker to nature and to himself."
Thus, the emergence of property rights creates the possibility of progress,
that is the subordination of nature to man, but it also creates hostile social clas-
ses. In this alienated environment the state emerges as a means of preserving
the existing property relations and protecting the possessing class against the
nonpossessing class. Marx was very positive in his belief that the state does not
create property relations; its function being to guarantee the existing ones. The
existing property relations describe the prevailing social power and from them
the passive role of the state is deduced analytically.
Pejovich, Towards an Economic Theory of the Creation and Specification of Property
Rights, in THE ECONOMICS OF LEGAL RELATIONSHIPS 46-47 (H. Manne ed. 1975) (footnotes
omitted) (quoting K. MARX, ECONOMIC AND PHILOSOPHICAL MANUSCRIPTS OF 1844, at 101-03
(1960)).
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plications. The payment of wages entitles the employer to both
the labor of the employee and the products of that labor. Accom-
panying the wage relationship is the proposition that "authority
over the manner of work and the workplace belongs to the em-
ployer, not the employee. In this way the employer can conform
the work to the requirements of production, enforcing the most ef-
ficient division of labor . . . . " Thus, among the most important
implications of the wage relationship is its effect on vested senior-
ity rights-seniority rights have conformed to the economic neces-
sities of the owners of capital. Management's desire for a mobile
labor force has limited the vesting of seniority rights, thereby re-
ducing the cost of removing an employee and casting the burden of
an economic crisis upon the laborer.
B. Locke's Influence on Government
A fundamental aspect of Locke's labor theory of property ac-
quisition is his conceptualization of a government that recognizes
the primacy and immutability of certain moral rights and duties.
According to Locke, a legitimate government is one derived from a
social contract or agreement between the body politic and the rul-
ing authority.54 Locke believed that the government's existence
could be justified only by, and with the consent of, the governed;
therefore, the government could not justifiably deprive anyone of
his life, liberty, or property except by his own consent. The right to
unequal property is an example of a right that men brought into
civil society. Therefore, it is individual consent in the state of na-
ture, and not the agreement to enter civil society, that justifies
property in excess of the initial natural limit.
Locke draws an important distinction between natural power
and natural rights. When men enter into political society, they sur-
render their natural power to the legislature, but they do not sur-
render their natural rights. The legislature is given the duty to reg-
ulate this power in accordance with natural law." If the legislature
53. Feinman, The Development of the Employment at Will Rule, 20 AM. J. LEGAL
HIST. 118, 132 (1976). Although the employment-at-will doctrine is beyond the scope of this
Comment, it produces similar results. Feinman makes the point that "termination at will is
the law's development of a fundamental principle of the economy." Id. at 118.
54. Natural rights take precedence over those principles that are established by the
socio-political practices of men: "The Obligations of the Law of Nature, cease not in Society
but only in many Cases are drawn closer, and have by Humane Laws known Penalties an-
nexed to them, to inforce their observation. Thus the Law of Nature stands as an Eternal
Rule to all Men, Legislators as well as other." J. LOCKE, supra note 4, § 135.
55. Id.
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transgresses the law of nature, men regain the power to exercise
their natural rights"0 and, if necessary, even revolt against the gov-
ernment. 7 The threat of revolution acts as a check upon the legis-
lature to ensure that it properly regulates the powers entrusted to
it.
In a state of nature, men direct their natural power toward
preservation of property. After this power is entrusted to the legis-
lature, it is directed toward the same end. Locke equated the pub-
lic good with the preservation of property and, in so doing, sug-
gested that the aim of the legislature is identical to the aim of men
who enter into political society.8 Locke's definition of political
power established a means-end relationship between the regulation
of property and the public good:
The public good can be considered as a principle of justice gov-
erning society in either of two ways: as an aggregative principle
it refers only to the total amount of good enjoyed by a particular
group; as a distributive principle it refers to the share of that
good which different members of the group have for themselves
... . Since the public good is the natural end of preservation as
it applies to political society, it is equivalent to the good or pres-
ervation of each .... [T]he preservation of each, including
comfort as well as support, entails three natural rights: to pres-
56. For no Man, or Society of Men, having a Power to deliver up their Preserva-
tion, or consequently the means of it, to the Absolute Will and aribitrary Do-
minion of another; whenever any one shall go about to bring them into such a
Slavish Condition, they will always have a right to preserve what they have not a
Power to part with; and to rid themselves of those who invade this Fundamen-
tal, Sacred, and unalterable Law of Self-Preservation, for which they enter'd
into Society.
Id. § 149.
57. A recent study indicates that as early as 1681, Locke set out to refute the theories
of Sir Robert Filmer. Laslett, Introduction to J. LOCKE, supra note 4, at 72. Filmer believed
that the state was a patriarchal society under the king. The patriarchalists argued that abso-
lute monarchy was the only proper form of government. This view was rooted in the doc-
trine of the divine right of kings. See J. DUNN, THE POLITIcAL THOUGHT OF JOHN LocKE 50
(1969).
Locke's refutation of Filmer went beyond a basic outline of legitimate royal authority.
Instead, he offered a theoretical basis for the ultimate right of revolution. This is important,
because it illustrates that he did not write his Two Treatises simply to justify the Glorious
Whig Revolution of 1688. Id. at 60.
58. Locke's definition of political power encompasses this notion:
Political Power then I take to be a Right of making Laws with Penalties of
Death, and consequently all less Penalties, for the Regulating and Preserving of
Property, and of employing the force of the Community, in the Execution of
such Laws, and in the defence of the Common-wealth from Foreign Injury, and
all this only for the Publick Good.
J. LOCKE, supra note 4, § 3.
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ervation, to the liberty of preserving oneself and others, and to
the material possessions necessary for preservation. These claim
rights to life, liberty and possessions are completed and regu-
lated naturally in the state of nature and, by this means, preser-
vation is realised.5 9
Having established that the preservation of property was com-
mensurate with the public good, Locke concluded that the natural
end of political society was the public good: "[The legislature's]
Power in the utmost Bounds of it, is limited to the publick good of
the Society. It is a Power, that hath no other end but preservation,
and therefore can never have a right to destroy, enslave, or design-
edly to impoverish the Subjects." 0
C. Locke's Influence on Nineteenth-Century Jurisprudence
Locke has played an important role in America's philosophical
tradition. His premise that the purpose of government is to pre-
serve individual rights found support in the American colonies.
Men such as Thomas Jefferson"1 and Thomas Paine quoted John
Locke in constructing a framework for the American Revolution.
While these men echoed Locke's theories on government, Locke's
notion of property rights found expression in other arenas.
Locke's theory that property was inseparable from personality
was absorbed easily into the thinking of a pre-industrial nation.
As late as 1886, the Supreme Court of the United States relied on
the fourteenth amendment 2 to protect personal opportunity. In
Yick Wo v. Hopkins," the Court reversed a conviction under a mu-
59. J. TULLY, A DiscouasE ON PROPERTY 162-63 (1980) (citations omitted).
60. J. LOCKE, supra note 4, § 135.
61. Mr. Jefferson found in the Civil Government the raw material for his organ-
like prelude to the Declaration of Independence. A number of erstwhile colonies
had to be welded into a union,-and from the same storehouse ideas were drawn
for incorporation into a Constitution which was to be "the supreme law of the
land." In it "the forces of democracy" were "set over against the forces of prop-
erty" and a "fundamental division of powers" was effected "between voters on
the one hand and property-owners on the other."
Hamilton, Property According to Locke, 41 YALE L.J. 864, 873 (1932) (footnotes omitted).
62. The fourteenth amendment provides in pertinent part:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any per-
son of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
63. 118 U.S. 356 (1886). Yick Wo was a Chinese alien who had operated a laundry
business for many years. The trial court convicted him of violating the licensing ordinance
when he continued to operate his business without a permit.
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nicipal ordinance that prohibited the construction of wooden laun-
dries without a license granted by a board of supervisors. Although
the licensors' decisions were entirely discretionary, the Court
found them blatantly unjust because the board granted permits to
seventy-nine of the eighty non-Chinese applicants, but to none of
the two hundred Chinese applicants. The Court noted that the
fourteenth amendment protected the Chinese laundry operators
from the discriminatory administration of local laws. This right to
equal protection of the laws preserved their businesses, the owner-
ship of which constituted a property right:
[T]he fundamental rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of hap-
piness, considered as individual possessions, are secured by
those maxims of constitutional law which are the monuments
showing the victorious progress of the race in securing to men
the blessings of civilization under the reign of just and equal
laws .... For, the very idea that one man may be compelled to
hold his life, or the means of living, or any material right essen-
tial to the enjoyment of life, at the mere will of another, seems
to be intolerable in any country where freedom prevails, as being
the essence of slavery itself.'
The rise of industrialism, however, severely strained Locke's phi-
losophy: "[Industrialism] separated the laborer from the instru-
ments of production, articulated establishments into an industrial
system, and enabled a capitalistic ownership to come into the re-
pute of a personalized property."'6
The Slaughter-House Cases," at least in spirit, are a fine ex-
ample of the new industrialism at work. These cases concerned an
1869 Louisiana statute that awarded a monopoly to a slaughter-
house company in New Orleans."7 The statute granted the Cres-
cent City Live-Stock Landing & Slaughter-House Company a
twenty-five-year license to manage the slaughtering of all animals
in the New Orleans area. The legislation effectively deprived ap-
proximately one thousand butchers of work. Some of these butch-
ers sought an injunction against the monopoly, contending that the
statute deprived them of the "right to exercise their trade" 5 and
64. Id. at 370.
65. Hamilton, supra note 61, at 877. See generally A. BERLE & G. MEANS, THE MODERN
CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932).
66. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
67. The act was entitled "An act to protect the health of the city of New Orleans, to
locate the stock-landings and slaughter-houses, and to incorporate the Crescent City Live-
Stock Landing and Slaughter-House Company." Id. at 59.
68. Id. at 60.
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was violative of the fourteenth amendment.69 The Supreme Court
of Louisiana decided in favor of the slaughterhouse company.
Represented by the former Mr. Justice Campbell, the butchers
.then appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States. Locke's
influence on the case is best manifested in the butchers' brief,
which stated,
The right to labor, the right to one's self physically and intellec-
tually, and to the product of one's own faculties, is past doubt
property, and property of a sacred kind. Yet this property is de-
stroyed by the act; destroyed not by due process of law, but by
charter; a grant of privilege, of monopoly. . . 70
The Supreme Court held that the Louisiana law did not violate the
fourteenth amendment's privileges and immunities clause. Al-
though the Court recognized that the right of a butcher to ply his
trade was among those civil rights of state citizens that could not
be infringed lawfully, Justice Miller refused to find the statute un-
constitutional, holding that it represented a classic exercise of the
state police power.7
Justices Field, Bradley, and Swayne strongly disagreed with
the reasoning of the majority opinion. They relied on the natural
law tradition and argued that no government could deprive its citi-
zens of their inherent rights:
The right of a State to regulate the conduct of its citizens is
undoubtedly a very broad and extensive one, and not to be
lightly restricted. But there are certain fundamental rights
which this right of regulation cannot infringe. It may prescribe
the manner of their exercise, but it cannot subvert the rights
themselves .7
Justice Swayne emphasized that the monopoly granted by Louisi-
ana to the slaughterhouse deprived the butchers of their livelihood.
69. The butchers charged that the Louisiana law violated the fourteenth amendment,
see supra note 62, by abridging the "privileges and immunities" of United States citizens,
denying the plaintiffs "the equal protection of the laws," and depriving them "of their prop-
erty without due process of law." They also argued that the statute created an "involuntary
servitude" in violation of the thirteenth amendment.
70. Abstract of the argument against monopolies, Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16
Wall.) 36, 56 (1873).
71. Id. at 60-63. The implication here, tenuous as it might seem, is that a law that
prohibits a person from plying his trade is not unconstitutional as long as it can be charac-
terized as an exercise of the state's police power.
72. Chief Justice Chase also dissented but did not write a separate opinion.
73. Id. at 114 (Bradley, J., dissenting); see also id. at 95-96 (Field, J., dissenting) (ex-
pressing similar sentiments).
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He also argued that the statute violated the butchers' fundamental
rights under the fourteenth amendment and characterized these
rights in Lockian fashion:
Life is the gift of God, and the right to preserve it is the most
sacred of the rights of man. Liberty is freedom from all re-
straints but such as are justly imposed by law. Beyond that line
lies the domain of unsurpation and tyranny. Property is every-
thing which has an exchangeable value, and the right of prop-
erty includes the power to dispose of it according to the will of
the owner. Labor is property, and as such merits protection. The
right to make it available is next in importance to the rights of
life and liberty."'
Swayne concluded that the availability of labor is, to a large ex-
tent, the foundation of most other forms of property and conse-
quently warranted a high degree of protection.
Toward the end of the nineteenth century, capitalists sought
to expand the scope of the fourteenth amendment. The American
legal system soon felt the pressures of a growing industrialism:
"The modern industrial system came into being-and the most
Lockian phrases in the Constitution were employed to guard its
integrity. The property which Locke knew,-or perhaps only wrote
about,-receded; and business enterprise won for itself certain im-
munities from its former over-lord, the state."75 Corporate inter-
ests, arguing that a laissez-faire attitude was necessary to maintain
growth, sought to use the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment as a means of protecting the legal rights of industry.
In Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad7 the Su-
preme Court of the United States observed that corporations were
"persons" within the meaning of the equal protection clause and
therefore were entitled to the protection of the fourteenth amend-
74. Id. at 127 (Swayne, J., dissenting).
75. Hamilton, supra note 61, at 874. "The parallel growth of judicial review made the
judiciary the overlord of the legislature, assigned to it a role in the control of the economic
order, and gave to the ownership of corporate wealth the protection of the Constitution." Id.
at 877.
The rise of substantive due process is an example of this idea. In the Slaughter-House
Cases, the United States Supreme Court rejected the notion of substantive due process. By
the end of the nineteenth century, however, substantive due process became an integral part
of American jurisprudence. See Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897).
In Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), the Court invalidated a New York law
prohibiting the employment of bakery employees for more than ten hours a day or sixty
hours a week. The Court deemed the law "an illegal interference with the rights of individu-
als." Id. at 61.
76. 118 U.S. 394 (1886).
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ment.7 Decisions such as Santa Clara have produced a tension be-
tween individual and corporate rights. The property that Locke
justified by natural right was an isolated possession of personal ori-
gin; the property of modern industrialism is an aggregate of rights
inseparable from the gigantic collectivism of business.7 s
The development of a property right inseparable from the
rights of industry eventually led to reform. The reformers argued
that in contrast to Locke's theory, property must be separated
from personality. "The regulatory agencies . . . were born of the
reform. In sustaining . . . major inroads on private property, the
Supreme Court rejected the older idea that property and liberty
were one, and wrote a series of classic opinions upholding the
power of the people to regulate and limit private rights. 7 9 The re-
forms enacted by legislatures limited corporate power and in-
creased the power of the federal government." This trend has not
protected or benefited the individual.8 "
In summary, modern industrialism placed severe limitations
on the labor theory of property acquisition. 2 Even so, Locke's im-
portance in American jurisprudence should not be diminished.
Locke could not have anticipated the rise of modern industrialism
and its accompanying perils. As one commentator suggested, at the
time Locke wrote the Second Treatise, "[s]upporters of capitalist
77. See also Mississippi R.R. Comm'n v. Mobile & Ohio R.R., 244 U.S. 388, 391 (1917)
(state may not exercise regulatory powers in arbitrary and unreasonable manner so as to
deprive railroad of a fair return on its invested capital).
78. See Hamilton, supra note 61, at 877, 879.
79. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 773 (1964).
80. Id.
81. Professor Reich wrote,
Government as an employer, or as a dispenser of wealth, has used the theory
that it was handing out gratuities to claim a managerial power as great as that
which the capitalists claimed. Moreover, the corporations allied themselves
with, or actually took over, part of government's system of power. Today it is the
combined power of government and the corporations that presses against the
individual.
Id.
82. As one commentator observed in 1932,
The individual is no longer thought of as a miniature god who has a title to his
own creation. It is now impossible to place a mark of personal workmanship
upon any chattel; a multitude of men have mixed their labor-and many an-
other personal contribution beside-into such earthly possessions as a motor-car,
a sky-scraper, a railroad, a going concern, and a handful of intangibles. In an
economic order which comprehends all men the technical contribution of the
individual to usable wealth cannot be isolated and measured. Nor can "the
worth he has produced" be determined except in terms of the market value of
his services or property,-and that is begging the question.
Hamilton, supra note 61, at 878.
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production, of whom Locke was one, were not yet troubled in their
consciences about any dehumanizing effects of labour being made
into a commodity . . . ." The Bill of Rights and the fourteenth
amendment were enacted to make the people secure in their per-
sons and property. When it came time to interpret these enact-
ments, however, the judiciary failed to realize the import of
Locke's words. Instead, "property" became a catchword for an ac-
cumulation of rights in whose name the rise of modern industrial-
ism largely went unchecked. Subsequent reforms stressed the need
for a separation of property and personality and created an even
greater gap than previously had existed between Locke's theory of
property and contemporary concepts.
IV. THE Glidden APPROACH TO VESTED SENIORITY RIGHTS
A. Glidden Revisited: A Post-Mortem or a
Prophetic Message?
The tension between rights created under a collective-bargain-
ing agreement and the concept of vested seniority rights results
from an incoherent approach toward a definition of property
rights. The rise of modern industrialism, with its emphasis on the
wage relationship and a mobile labor force, severed the link be-
tween personality and property, thereby rendering Locke's theory
something of an anachronism. Yet, vestiges of the labor theory still
remain, as evidenced by the steady stream of litigation over vested
seniority rights.84 These disputes center on an issue related to
Locke's formulations: whether an employee has a vested right in
his employment, based not upon a contract, but rather upon a
property right derived from his seniority status. Not surprisingly,
the concerns over capital and a transient labor force also play an
important role in the resolution of this issue. A comparison of
Cooper and Glidden demonstrates how these two factors have
helped to shape our attitude toward vested seniority rights.
Cooper reflects the well-accepted rule that an employer can
relocate part or all of his operation, provided that the relocation
did not violate a contract, was justified economically, and was not
83. C. MACPHERSON, supra note 46, at 217.
84. See, e.g., Schick v. NLRB, 409 F.2d 395 (7th Cir. 1969); Charland v. Norge Div.,
Borg Warner Corp., 407 F.2d 1062 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 871 (1969); Oddie v.
Ross Gear & Tool Co., 305 F.2d 143 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 941 (1962); Conran v.
Great Ati. & Pac. Tea Co., 499 F. Supp. 727 (E.D. Pa. 1980); Crusco v. Fisher & Bros., 458
F. Supp. 413 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
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motivated by anti-union sentiment.85 Consequently, commentators
have characterized Glidden as part of a belated effort by the courts
"to catch up with what has been a serious gap in the common law
analysis of job rights. '88 In a speech before the American Law In-
stitute, then-Secretary of Labor Arthur Goldberg commented upon
this failure in the development of common-law concepts:
[T]he genius which produced the law of property rights and
commercial instruments, which developed the corporate fiction
that permitted the combination of capital, and established rules
of reasonable notice to protect tenants from unconscionable,
summary eviction, had left a working man vulnerable to instant
discharge, despite years of faithful service. This failure of the
common law led, through collective bargaining, to a private con-
cept of job rights which "The Law" itself had failed to develop."
Most courts and commentators disagree with this Glidden-
type analysis.8 8 In fact, reaction to the Glidden opinion was swift
and predominantly adverse. Several writers accused the court of
legislating what it considered to be a desirable social result, rather
than applying a valid legal concept. They argued that, by compel-
ling the employer to expressly negate the concept of vested senior-
ity rights at the bargaining table, Glidden placed an unfair burden
on the employer.8 ' Much of the criticism of Glidden is misplaced.
By emphasizing the security aspect of seniority,90 the Second Cir-
85. See NLRB v. Rapid Bindery, Inc., 293 F.2d 170 (2d Cir. 1961).
86. Panel Discussion, Plant Removals and Related Problems, 13 LAB. L.J. 914, 914
(1962).
87. Id. (panelist's paraphrase of remarks by Secretary Goldberg).
88. See, e.g., Woody v. Sterling Prods., Inc., 365 F.2d 448 (8th Cir. 1966) (collective-
bargaining agreement defines scope and extent of employee's rights); NLRB v. Local 542,
Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, 331 F.2d 99 (3d Cir. 1964) (union recognition does not
survive collective-bargaining agreement); Proctor & Gamble Indus. Union v. Proctor &
Gamble Co., 312 F.2d 181 (2d Cir. 1962) (agreement to arbitrate not applicable because
grievance arose after expiration of the agreement); Oddie v. Ross Gear & Tool Co., 305 F.2d
143 (6th Cir. 1962) (employees not entitled to assert seniority acquired in old plant for
purpose of being hired at new plant); Aaron, Reflections on the Legal Nature and Enforce-
ability of Seniority Rights, 75 HARV. L. REv. 1532 (1962); Lowden, Survival ,of Seniority
Rights Under Collective Agreements: Zdanok v. Glidden Co., 48 VA. L. REv. 291 (1962);
Turner, Plant Removals and Related Problems, 13 LAB. L.J. 907 (1962); Comment, Indus-
trial Mobility and Survival of Senority-What Price Security?, 36 S. CAL. L. REV. 269
(1963).
89. See Panel Discussion, supra note 86, at 915; see also Local 1251 UAW v. Robert-
shaw Controls Co., 405 F.2d 29, 33 (2d Cir. 1968) (Court must "construe the contract upon
which the parties agreed and not ... substitute for it one with more humane or less de-
structive terms.") (quoting Chief Justice Lumbard's dissent in Zdanok v. Glidden, 288 F.2d
99, 105 (2d Cir. 1961)).
90. The basic reason for the existence of the seniority system is to protect workers with
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cuit extended protection to employment interests that courts had
overlooked for many years. Although Glidden suffers from ambigu-
ity, its result nonetheless has a strong philosophical base: vested
seniority rights give rise to a possessory interest in one's job.
B. The Nature of Seniority
The fact that seniority is composed of certain security aspects
helps to illustrate the philosophical underpinnings of vested se-
niority rights." A worker's participation in a collective bargaining
unit is an unconscious reassertion that man must, in some respects,
be identified with his work:
Every discussion of shop rules, of efficiency, of grievances, of
rights and duties, of obligations and expectancies, embodies the
recognition that the relationship between man and his work can-
not be defined as purely impersonal, pecuniary, and fluid. The
union embraces a concern about the industry, and the feeling, so
evident in a thousand past instances, of "this is my job" is but a
pathetic restatement that the work and the man belong to each
other.2
Seniority rights, therefore, are an outgrowth of the laboro move-
ment. They are not inherent in the employment relationship but
arise instead from either a statute or a collective bargaining
agreement.94
The Glidden court correctly reasoned that job security, as
measured by seniority status, is meaningless if a company is al-
lowed to terminate unilaterally seniority rights. Implicit in this
reasoning is the notion that seniority is a type of "unemployment
insurance" that vests over time.95 An employee with seniority
rights expects that as he works, he provides not only for his imme-
diate needs, but also for his future needs. For example, in the case
of a layoff, seniority status is frequently used to determine which
the longest terms of service from future industrial problems.
91. The development of trade unions has been characterized as "an attempt by individ-
ual workers to escape from insecurity." F. TANNENBAUM, A PHILOSOPHY OF LABOR 176
(1951).
92. See id.
93. The legislature, unlike the judiciary, has been willing to protect seniority rights. For
example, Congress creates and protects the seniority rights of employees who enter military
service, thereby assuring them a preferential right to reemployment when they return to
civilian life. See 38 U.S.C. § 2021 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
94. See, e.g., Aaron, supra note 88, at 1533.
95. Glidden, 288 F.2d at 103.
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workers will be dismissed."
In contrast to Glidden, cases like Cooper seem to discount the
security aspect of seniority: "Whether or not any of the plaintiffs
relied on the old agreement in accepting promotions to supervisory
positions is immaterial. By relying on a contract of limited dura-
tion, imminently subject to renegotiation, [the supervisory person-
nel] could not estop the parties from changing it.'' 7 In refusing to
recognize that seniority rights are extracontractual, courts have
placed greater emphasis on the day-to-day benefits of seniority.98
This refusal has immunized modern employers from a vast number
of claims.
The holding in Glidden demonstrates a willingness on the part
of one court to analogize the security aspects of seniority to other
types of security interests that have been protected in the past.
Courts and arbitrators generally have agreed that benefits other
than seniority often survive termination of the collective bargain-
ing agreement. The rights to vacation pay,99 severance pay,"'0 and
retirement pay101 may be enforced after the contract expires or is
terminated: "[Tihese are monetary rights which are earned by vir-
tue of the employee's service and form a part of his earned wages.
96. In constructing a model of industrial pluralism, David Feller seems to place great
emphasis on this function of seniority:
Seniority provides an ideal example of both the employee consent and the
management disciplinary functions of the collective agreement . . . . There is
undoubtedly an advantage in promoting the most qualified employees to vacant
positions and in retaining the most efficient when layoffs are required. Judg-
ments as to these matters, however, are not precise and when the decisions are
made, as they must be, at a low level of the management bureaucracy there are
enormous possibilities for favoritism or the use of improper criteria. Perhaps of
more importance, there is usually no adequate method by which it can be
demonstrated that the choice of persons to be promoted or laid off is not based
on considerations unrelated to performance ...
Length of service, on the other hand, can be objectively calculated by fixed,
if sometimes arbitrary, rules. Use of the seniority criterion thus both eliminates
a possible source of employee resentment and ensures that lower elements in the
managerial hierarchy do not misuse the authority given them.
Feller, A General Theory of the Collective Bargaining Agreement, 61 CALIF. L. REv. 663,
768 (1973) (footnote omitted). Applying this model, seniority rights vest in the collective
unit rather than in the individual; "[tihe collective bargaining agreement is not a contract
between the employer and any employee .... " Id. at 773.
97. Cooper, 651 F.2d at 251.
98. The day-to-day benefits of seniority are those aspects of seniority other than the
job security aspect. One example is the determination of wage rates based on the amount of
time employed; the amount of vacation time permitted is another.
99. In re Wil-Low Cafeterias, Inc., 111 F.2d 429 (2d Cir. 1940).
100. Owens v. Press Publishing Co., 20 N.J. 537, 120 A.2d 442 (1956).
101. Richardson v. Communications Workers of Am., 443 F.2d 974, 979 (8th Cir. 1971).
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Some writers refer to these as vested rights."' 0 2
C. Policy Considerations
Glidden represents a resolution of the tension between two
competing needs: the employer's need for mobility of industry and
the employee's need for economic security. 03 The remedy offered
by Glidden protects older blue-collar employees who, though still
capable of good work, might be laid off and forced to face an un-
welcome job market. 10 4 The Glidden decision "may clarify the con-
ditions under which industrial innovations will take place, thus
paving the way for wiser and more humane solutions to some of
the problems implicit in industrial change. '10 5
Whether this post-Glidden panacea can be realized by the
American labor force is questionable given the dynamics of the
present economy: "The rapidity of technological change strongly
suggests that the average employee in the immediate future will
have to change jobs at least several times during his working
life."' 0 Like the rise of industrialism in the late nineteenth cen-
tury, which strained Locke's theories,/° the technological revolu-
tion in the past twenty years has contributed greatly to the contin-
uing separation of men from the product of their labor. This
separation will no doubt continue to limit the concept of vested
seniority rights to a very particularized area.'0 ' In order to protect
102. Seminar, Plant Removals and Subcontracting of Work, 14 LAB. L.J. 366, 371
(1963) (comments by Irving M. Friedman).
103. See Blumrosen, supra note 29, at 526.
104. The following unemployment figures for the past two years indicate that blue-col-
lar workers have been hit the hardest during the current employment crisis.
UNEMPLOYMENT RATE
Characteristic Annual Average( %)
1980 1981 August 1982
Total, 16 years
and over 7.1 7.6 9.8
White-collar
workers 3.7 4.0 4.8
Blue-collar
workers 10.0 10.3 14.2
BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, 105 MONTHLY LAB. REv. 57, 62 (1982).
105. Blumrosen, supra note 29, at 527.
106. Aaron, supra note 88, at 1563. Professor Aaron also had suggested that automa-
tion, which has drastically changed our concepts of work, may cause the seniority principle
to become obsolete.
107. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
108. Faculty tenure is an example of a vested seniority right. It ensures that a faculty
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the value of labor in a rapidly changing market, courts should at-
tempt to slow this growing rift equitably.
[Ilndustrial power has value in our society only if men, and not
machines, are the masters. The well being of the individual pro-
vides the rationale for these intensive efforts to increase and im-
prove industrial production. The worker's quest for security is as
urgent a need, as important a social value, as the mobility of
industry. Each is a sine qua non of continuing progress in our
society, and although the values appear to conflict, they are also
complementary.' 0
Today, courts apparently are reluctant to protect the worker
during periods of economic change. 110 For example, the Cooper
court subtly relied on this reluctance in making its decision." The
most troubling aspect of this trend is that decisions such as
Cooper, by weakening the worker's bargaining position, are con-
tributing to the economic problems of the American labor force. A
new judicial attitude, shaped by Glidden, would help to fortify la-
bor's negotiating position in the collective-bargaining process.
member will not be terminated without adequate cause. At a public institution, elaborate
procedures are constitutionally required before a tenured professor may be terminated. See
Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972);
Slochower v. Board of Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956). At a private institution, elaborate
procedural safeguards are often mandated by contract. See generally Lehmann v. Board of
Trustees of Whitman College, 89 Wash. 2d 874, 576 P.2d 397 (1978). In Lehmann an advi-
sory investigatory committee held 21 sessions and heard testimony from 20 persons. This
was followed by an additional nine days of hearings that produced a 1,249 page transcript.
109. Comment, supra note 88, at 283.
110. The Third Circuit's approach in In re Bildisco, 682 F.2d 72 (3d Cir. 1982), illus-
trates this point. The issue was whether a debtor-in-possession may reject a collective bar-
gaining agreement as an executory contract. Id. at 74. The court held that section 365(a) of
the Bankruptcy Reform Act does permit such a rejection. Id. at 78; see 11 U.S.C. § 365(a)
(1976 & Supp. V 1981). An important aspect of the court's analysis is its recognition of the
current economic problems:
Because Bildisco is involved in the building supply business, a business directly
associated with the construction business, and the employees who are covered by
the labor contract are warehousemen, drivers, mechanics, and outside field ser-
vicemen, it is significant that 18.1% of the nation's construction workers were
unemployed compared with 12.5% of blue-collar workers in general. Under cir-
cumstances of a distressed economy, a bankruptcy court could properly consider
that it would be in the interests of the workers in a bargaining unit to be af-
forded the opportunity to continue to work under less generous financial benefits
than to insist upon an absolute payment of vacation benefits, pension, health
and welfare benefits, and wage increases. In weighing the equities the court
could well conclude that it is in the public interest for employees to work with-
out the advantage of fringe benefits than not to work at all.
682 F.2d at 81 n.13 (citation omitted).
111. Cooper, 651 F.2d at 250-51.
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D. Implications
Upon close examination, the entire collective-bargaining pro-
cess is affected by the characterization of seniority as a vested
right. As previously noted, the development of seniority rights has
conformed to the economic necessities of the owners of capital. "'
This results in a presumption in favor of the employer that senior-
ity rights generally do not vest. At first blush, Glidden effectuates
a new presumption that requires management to introduce strong
evidence to prove that the agreement was not intended to create
vested seniority rights. If management is unable to satisfy this bur-
den, then it will be forced to either accede to this view or bargain
over labor's seniority rights.
It has been argued that the right to follow the work recognized
in Zdanok v. Glidden will not be extensively exercised, but will
be waived in exchange for a little more severance pay. Such a
result will simply reflect the needs of the parties as expressed in
collective bargaining .... Law in labor relations does not dic-
tate the choices that union, management, and employee must
make. It creates a framework within which the various decisions
are worked out. The parties are free to shape their own actions
within this framework. One method that provides flexibility is
the ability to convert rights into money.'
Glidden forces management to articulate better its position at
the bargaining table because the characterization of seniority as a
vested right places labor in a more advantageous position. Since a
majority of the disputes involving seniority will be disposed of
through the grievance process," 4 the need for greater specificity in
the bargaining process will be acute. If this specificity is found
wanting, then arbitrators will be allowed to deal with these cases
112. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
113. Blumrosen, supra note 29, at 526 (footnote omitted).
114. In a series of cases involving the United Steelworkers of America, the Supreme
Court of the United States announced that courts would have a limited role in actions to
enforce arbitration awards:
In those cases, the Court exalted the role of the arbitrator as a force for indus-
trial peace, articulated a view of the labor contract as a working arrangement
between labor and management engrossing unwritten understandings and plant
practices not reflected in the written terms, and announced a doctrine of judicial
self-retraint in cases in which the parties have assigned the task of dispute reso-
lution to an arbitrator privately selected.
R. GORMAN, BASIc TEXT ON LABOR LAW 551 (1976); see United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enter-
prise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior &
Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers of Am. v. American Mfg. Co.,
363 U.S. 564 (1960).
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on an ad hoc basis without developing abstract principles to re-
solve them.'1 5
V. CONCLUSION: A CONCEPTUAL APPROACH TO
VESTED SENIORITY RIGHTS
The distinction between Cooper and Glidden manifests itself
as a conflict in property rights:
In a sense, the labor movement embodies the development of a
new set of property rights generated within the womb of an
older set of property concepts. The older set must either repress
the developing concepts or adapt to them by a process of accom-
modation. Collective bargaining is essentially an experimental
procedure to reconcile these conflicting property concepts in an
evolving social system."'
This interpretation provides a coherent approach to the seniority
question. In an effort to offset the obsolescence and displacement
of basic skills, which are natural products of a rapidly changing
economy, Glidden attempts to establish a property right for the
worker in his job. This result is warranted because of the inequal-
ity that exists between the owners of capital and the owners of
labor.1 1 7 The existence of a property right in one's work is rooted
in Locke's labor theory of property acquisition and is given current
expression by the system of closed shops and closed unions. One
author who compared contemporary notions toward private prop-
erty and labor recognized the traditional link between personality
and property:
The deep feeling of private property holders about their land
finds its sanction in a complex jurisprudence that goes back to
John Locke and Blackstone. The same deep feeling of workers
about the property rights in their jobs received its first quasi-
legal sanction in 1926 with the passage of the Railway Labor
Act. We do not question the rationality of the feeling of the
private property holder. It is part of our system of conditioned
reflex. We are confused by the apparently irrational behavior of
workers who will not sacrifice their property rights in the name
115. See Blumrosen, supra note 29, at 509.
116. Gomberg, Featherbedding: An Assertion of Property Rights, in READINGS IN LA-
BOR ECONOMICS AND LABOR RELATIONS 350-51 (R. Rowan ed. 1972).
117. The owners of capital are compensated for the deterioration of their capital values
through the process of depreciation. I.R.C. § 167 (West 1982). No similar protection is af-
forded to the owners of labor. But cf. Rottenberg, Property in Work, in READINGS IN LABOR
ECONOMICS AND LABOR RELATIONS 359 (R. Rowan ed. 1972).
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of productivity. Are the differences in our reactions a matter of
tradition?"'
If we decide that the differences in our attitude toward private
property and labor are a matter of tradition, then we have ignored
an important goal of the labor movement. Selig Perlman, in A
Theory of the Labor Movement, 1 9 identifies this goal as labor's
desire to wrest control of capital's private property rights. 120 There
are three possible means by which labor can accomplish this result:
the political and legislative route, the economic route, and the co-
operative production route. 12  Through the use of regulatory re-
strictions, the political and legislative route prevents the employer
from acquiring absolute control over the means of production.2
The economic route, which takes the form of union activity,
strikes, and boycotts, imposes restrictions on the rights of private
property that are even more far-reaching. 23 The cooperative pro-
duction route has the least effect on private property rights. This
course "sets out to beat private capitalism by the methods of pri-
vate business: greater efficiency and superior competitive
power.' 2 4
By characterizing the labor movement as a campaign against
the rights of private property, it becomes necessary to examine the
role that private property plays in American society: "The enor-
mous strength of private property in America, at once obvious to
any observer, goes back to the all-important fact that, by and
large, this country was occupied and settled by laboring pioneers,
creating property for themselves as they went along and holding it
in small parcels.' ' 2 5 Thus, early in American history, the laboring
118. Gomberg, supra note 116, at 352.
119. S. PERLMAN, A THEORY OF THE LABOR MOVEMENT (1949).
120. Perlman characterized the labor movement as "an organized campaign against the
rights of private property, even where it stops short of embracing a radical program seeking
the elimination, gradual or abrupt, 'constitutional' or violent, of the private entrepreneur."
Id. at 155-56.
121. Id. at 156.
122. Id. Minimum wage legislation is one example of how government has limited man-
agement's control over an important element of production-the cost of labor.
123. Id.
124. Id. What is meant by the cooperative production route is unclear. One example
may be employee ownership of the workplace. Early attempts to organize the workplace in
this fashion involved "workingmen who were seeking an escape from a rising industrial sys-
tem and who were trying desperately to preserve their rapidly disappearing status as skilled
and independent craftsmen." 1 P. FONER, HISTORY OF THE LABOR MOVEMENT IN THE UNITED
STATES 180 (1947). Most of these cooperatives failed. Id. at 181.
125. S. PERLMAN, supra note 119, at 157 (footnote omitted).
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class erected and owned private property. This seems antithetical
to the contemporary notion that the labor movement seeks to limit
the rights of private property.
The assertion of a property right in labor appears to conflict
with traditional American attitudes toward private property. In
order to resolve this problem, a proper balance must be struck be-
tween these conflicting interests. There are two possible solutions.
One solution imposes a systematized set of working rules that de-
fine an emerging property right for the worker in his job. If we
accept such a proposition, then we must conclude that when a
worker is deprived of his job, he is deprived of a property right for
which he is entitled to some sort of compensation.
[Wiorking rules . .. have had a profound effect upon the con-
cept of property, changing that concept from a principle of ex-
clusive holding of physical objects for the owner's private use,
into a principle of control of limited resources needed by others
for their use and thus into a concept of intangible and incorpo-
real property arising solely out of rules of law controlling
transactions.I' s
This solution does not offend traditional American attitudes. It
provides for the resolution of conflicting values through the process
of collective bargaining. 12 7 The rules that emerge from the collec-
tive-bargaining agreement correspond to the model of industrial
pluralism that is central to American labor law."2 s These rules are
126. J. COMMONS, LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF CAPITALISM 6, 7 (1957). Similarly, Professor
Gomberg offers the following example:
[A] jurisdictional claim of a yard worker that he and he alone can handle a train
in the yard and the corresponding claim of a road worker that he and he alone
can handle a train on the road stem from a property right of each craft in the
particular job area.
Gomberg, supra note 116, at 351.
127. David Feller explains management's acceptance of collective bargaining as follows:
[Any industrial enterprise must have a system of rules, and the larger and more
complex the enterprise, the greater the necessity for rules and their formaliza-
tion. Collective bargaining can serve many useful functions for management in
connection with the formulation and administration of these rules. First, it es-
tablishes a mechanism by which employee consent to those rules can be ob-
tained. That consent not only extends to those rules established in the collective
agreement but also to rules established by management in areas not covered by
the agreement to the extent that the union, by not insisting upon participation
in the formulation of those rules, can be said to have at least implicitly con-
sented to management's authority to impose them.
Feller, supra note 96, at 764.
128. See Cox, Some Aspects of the Labor Management Relations Act (pt. 1), 61 HAsv.
L. REv. 1 (1947). The doctrine of industrial pluralism categorizes the process of collective
bargaining as a system of self-government by management and labor.
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helpful in establishing a system of job security, which in turn pro-
motes greater productivity.
A second possible solution would be an active judiciary that
attempts to balance the property interests of the workers with
those of management:
[T]he law must intervene actively to alter the definitions of
property rights in order to create true equality. If such equality
is desirable, either to improve wages, hours, and working condi-
tions, or to affirm workers' dignity, then there must be a new
theoretical and doctrinal approach to the law of labor
relations.'2'
Glidden can be interpreted as an attempt to reconcile these
conflicting philosophies. It offers a partial solution to the problem
faced by the employee who has spent the greater part of his adult
life working for a single employer, only to find his job security de-
stroyed when the collective-bargaining agreement expires. Since
vested seniority rights are an effective means of dealing with an-
other common problem-the displacement of workers as a result of
new technologies-it may be best to classify this issue as a matter
of public policy. "This approach would enable workers to struggle
in the arena in which their strength is greatest-the national polit-
ical arena."1 0 Such a struggle would once again thrust upon gov-
ernment the duty to preserve individual rights, rather than the ac-
cumulation of rights in whose name we have witnessed the rise of
modern industrialism.
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